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William Eric Perkins
REQUIEM FOR A REVOLUTION:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE
U.S.jOECS* INTERVENTION
IN GRENADA
THE GRENADIAN REVOLUTION of March 13, 1979 offended the West Indian ad-
herence to Westminster democracy·· and directly challenged U.S. hegem-
ony in its major sphere of influence.· .. The People's Revolutionary Govern-
ment (PRG) led by the vanguard New Jewel Movement overthrew one of the
most corrupt, incompetent, and idiosyncratic regimes in the Western hemi-
sphere. The immediate response of the United States was one of cautious
approval. As Reagan's Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Sally Shelton,
remarked,
It is unfortunate that his (Gairy's) removal was by extra-eonstitutional
means but let's face it-that was probably the only way he would have
*The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States-ed.
**Westrninster democracy is characterized by a bicameral legislature with power in
the upper chamber; a cabinet system; the existence of a political opposition in the
form of parties which functions in extra-political terms when not in power; and
elections held at regular intervals-ed.
***This essay is a part of a larger work in progress with the working title, The Rise
and Fall ofthe Grenada Revolution: Class, Nation and the Theory ofNon-Capitalist
Development. I have incurred a number of debts while undertaking the research for
this work. Archibald Singham, of Brooklyn College, whose own work on the Gairy
regime is extremely important, has been a source of inspiration and encouragement.
Johnnetta Cole, of Hunter College, has provided me with a number of hard-to-get
sources. Congressmen Ronald Dellums and Mervyn Dymally, along with their staffs,
have given me the benefits of their experience in lobbying for the Afro-Caribbean
world, while providing me with a number of important documents and insights.
Dessima Williams, former ambassador from Grenada to the Organization of Ameri-
can States, shared some of her thoughts and reflections with me. Betty and Herman
Liveright, of the Berkshire Forum, allowed me to accompany them on a trip to
Grenada and to use invaluable taped dialogues with Don Rojas and Caldwell Taylor.
Kathy Halley, of the Congressional Black Associates, provided me with numerous
United States government documents, including transcripts of broadcasts from
Radio Free Grenada. Finally, Randall Robinson and the staff at TRANSAFRICA
opened their files to me.
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gone. When the 1979 Revolution occurred, the Caribbean (and many
elsewhere) breathed a sigh of relief that Gairy was gone. Many held great
expectations, strengthened by the new leadership (the New Jewel Move-
ment), that the trappings of democracy under Gairy would be replaced by
a true democratic system and socioeconomic reform. Prime Minister
Bishop himself promised national elections and committed himself to
improving the conditions of life of the Grenadian people. l
However, as the revolution attempted to consolidate itself, American toler-
ance gave way to hostility and that hostility crystallized in a policy of destabliza-
tion and ultimately intervention.
To understand the evolution of U.S. policy toward Grenada, it is necessary to
examine the development of the revolutionary forces, the contradictions that
emerged within them, the underdevelopment of Grenadian society, and the
international balance of forces. Essential to the revolution's impact on the
English-speaking Caribbean was its linkages to other would-be revolutionary
forces in the Windward and Leeward islands-the so-called "backyard" of the
United States. In addition, the impact of the Revolution on the large Afro-
American population of the United States did not go unnoticed.
Following a series of events during the tumultuous 1960s and early 1970s,
events including the Rodney affair of 1968 in Jamaica and the mutiny in
Trinidad in 1970, many Caribbean islands, from Grenada to Bermuda (the
northern most Antillean island) found their youth and intellectuals influenced
by the "Black Power" philosophy of Afro-America and the corresponding
ideology of Pan-African socialism.2 In Grenada, this ideological orientation
culminated in the unification of the largest and best known groups of the
progressive opposition to the Gairy regime-the Movement for Assemblies of
the People (MAP) led by Maurice Bishop and Kendrick Radix, and the Joint
Endeavor for Welfare, Education and Liberation (JEWEL) led by the rural
economist Unison Whiteman. Following their merger in 1973 and a series of
incidents leading to the brutal "Bloody Sunday" of November 18, 1973, the
I Hearings, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, United
States Policy Toward Grenada, June 15, 1982 (Washington, D.C.: 1982), pp. 65-66.
2See W. Raymond Duncan, "Caribbean Leftism," Problems of Communism,
XXVII (May-June 1978), pp. 33-57; "Rise of Black Power Brings Racial Strife to
Caribbean Region," The Wall Street Journal (December 12, 1970); Wade Greene,
"Caribbean 'Black Power'-Will Their Plans Affect Yours?" The New York Times
Travel Section (Sunday, February 7,1971); C. L. R. James, "Black Power," in Spheres
ofExistence (London, 1980), pp. 221-36; and Clive Thomas, "Walter Rodney and the
Caribbean Revolution," in Edward Alpers and Pierre-Michael Fontaine, (eds.), Walter
Rodney, Revolutionary and Scholar: A Tribute (Los Angeles, 1982), pp. 119-32.
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progressive forces began to grow. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) began to
organize a broad "national-democratic" front combining all classes-the agro-
proletariat, the small working class, civil servants, professionals and the mer-
chant petit-bourgeois. Its ideology was a combination of populism and African
socialism. "People's Assemblies" would replace the adversarial partisan system
of Westminster. The economy would be based on the "ujamaa" village system
found in Nyerere's Tanzania. Public services would be socialized, and a non-
aligned foreign policy would be adopted.3 It is important to note that the early
NJM was not self.~onsciouslyMarxist. That would not occur until mid-1975.
Following a series of secret meetings held in 1974 and 1975, the NJM pro-
claimed itself a vanguard party. The Political Bureau, Central Committee, and
cadre were reorganized. Centrists were expelled and a Marxist-Leninist ideo-
logical orientation adopted. In 1976, Bernard Coard and his wife Phyllis
resigned their teaching posts to return to Grenada. The Coards were uncom-
promising in tilting the NJM toward Marxism. Within the Party, the Coards
had formed the Organization for Research, Education and Liberation (0REL)
-a study group designed to train cadre in the essentials of Marxism-Leninism.
Moreover, and the evidence from the confiscated documents is overwhelming:
it was Coard who introduced the "non-capitalist way" into the ideological
vocabulary of the NJM. This was important in fomenting the factional splits
that would tear the movement apart in 1983.
From 1973 to early 1979, the NJM undertook mass political work, while at
the same time creating an armed wing within Gairy's military and police. This
clandestine organizing paved the way for the relatively peaceful insurrection of
March 13. Within twelve hours the NJM had completed the takeover. In its
earliest days, the PRG swept away the vestiges of Gairyism, suspended Parlia-
ment and the Constitution, and proclaimed a revolutionary regime. The PRG
had an immense task in rebuilding Grenadian society. An examination of the
political economy of the island and the attempt to transform it are essential to
review at this point.
Non-Capitalist Development and the Grenadian Revolution:
From its inception, the PRG's strategy to rebuild the economy was frought
with problems. Grenadian society was first of all a post-plantation economy.
3The best accounts of the growth of the New Jewel Movement (NJM), are EPICA
Task Force, Grenada: The Peaceful Revolution (Washington, D.C; 1982), particularly
pp. 42-56; and W. Richard Jacobs and Ian Jacobs, Grenada: The Route to Revolution
(La Habana: 1980), especially pp. 75-88.
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More than a third of its economy was devoted to the growth, processing, and
exporting of tropical produce-bananas, cacao, and nutmeg. Smallholding
was the dominant characteristic of landholding with more than 88% of the
holdings concentrated in the less than I-acre to 5-acre category.4 Though the
NJM set agricultural reform as one ofits top priorities, including the expansion
of the agro-industrial sector, collectivization of some farms, confiscation of
unused land, investment in rural infrastructure, and the creation of a farmer's
union, it tended to ignore the fundamental characteristic of West Indian small-
holding. As Patrick Emmanuel noted,
. . . property in the form of land was, for the mass, the reward for
emancipation from unrewarded slavery. The very substance of emancipa-
tion was enjoyed in the form of the mass experience of control over land.
This almost uniquely Caribbean sociology of property produced, over a
long period of time, a peasant state of mind or outlook, which is unrecep-
tive to socialist conceptions of collectivization.5
Consequently, the implementation of socialized agriculture did not meet
with an enthusiastic welcome by the Grenadian peasantry and agro-proletariat.
This, in itself, was to act as an impediment to one of the fundamental tenets of
the "non-capitalist" way-a mixed economy with the state sector dominant.
The concept of a non-capitalist path to economic development was initially
developed by Soviet intellectuals in order to facilitate the transition to socialism
in the backward regions of the old Czarist empire. It was later extended to
regimes in the Third World-most notably those in Mrica, including Algeria,
Egypt, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Bernard Coard and OREL made this
concept a cornerstone of the PRG through the Central Committee and the
Politbureau. The crucial texts were V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky,
Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical Outline, I. Andreyev, The Non-
Capitalist Way, and R. Ulyanovsky, Socialism and the Newly Independent
Nations. These texts guided the economic planning of the revolutionary
government and served as the ideological cement in terms of cadre education.
According to Solodovnikov and Bogoslovsky,
Non-capitalist development is a revolutionary process by which a national
liberation revolution gradually and consistently develops into a socialist
4The data are distilled from Table I in Patrick Emmanuel, "Revolutionary Theory
and Political Reality in the Eastern Caribbean," Journal ofInteramerican Studies and
World Affairs. Vol. XXV (May 1983), p. 210.
5Ibid.• p. 211.
4
Contributions in Black Studies, Vol. 7 [1985], Art. 2
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol7/iss1/2
Requiem for a Revolution
revolution in countries where the conditions for an immediate socialist
revolution have yet matured.6
7
In Grenada, this was certainly the case: both the objective and subjective
conditions of the revolution were inherently weak. The duty of the revolution-
ary party was to accelerate the objective conditions for the economic transition
to socialism, while educating the masses ideologically to carry through the
transition.
The main features of the non-eapitalist way can be summarized in the
following manner. First, an anti-imperialist foreign policy involving the dissolu-
tion of obligations, treaties, etc. with the imperialist power; the dismantling of
foreign military bases; a firm and principled stand against colonialism and
racism; support for national liberation movements and a shift to the world
revolutionary forces. Second, the abolition of imperial control over the econ-
omy, including the nationalization of banking, insurance, tourism, public
utilities, etc. Third, the consolidation of the mixed economy with the state and
mixed sectors dominant. Fourth, intensified political, cultural and ideological
struggle to remove bourgeois and imperial influences. Fifth, the introduction of
new attitudes toward work and production. Sixth and finally, the expansion of
both the organs of mass participation and political organizations.7 Though
some of these features were met by the PRG, others were not. An anatomy of
those features is essential to an understanding of the contradictions that
emerged within the revolutionary leadership.
Soviet theorists and their fraternal critics of the non-eapitalist way urge
developing revolutionary movements to be cognizant of the
. . . revolutionary potentialities among the petit-bourgeois leadership
usually found in these countries (of the Third World) in alliance with the
peasantry, proletarian and semi-proletarian classes, and progressive sec-
tors of the emerging national bourgeoisie.8
Indeed, in Grenada, as elsewhere in the Third World, the underdevelopment of
the traditional proletariat led to the emergence of the intelligentsia as the
6 V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development: An Historical
Outline, (Moscow: 1975), p. 89.
7This is a summary of the main points argued in Ralph Gonsalves' important
pamphlet, The Non-Capitalist Path of Development: Africa and the Caribbean (Lon-
don: 1981), pp. 8-12.
8 Clive Thomas, "'The Non-Capitalist Path' As Theory and Practice of Decoloniza-
tion and Socialist Transformation," Latin American Perspectives, V:2 (Spring 1978), p.
11; the problems of the West Indian petit bourgeoisie are admirably dissected in C. L. R.
James, "The West Indian Middle Classes," in Spheres ofExistence, pp. 131-40; and the
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vanguard force in collaboration with other classes and class fractions. This class
alliance, composing a broad national-democratic front, reflected a political
compromise on the part of the revolutionary leadership. On the other hand, the
class origins of the revolutionary intelligentsia presented the revolutionary
movement with hidden limitations. Often these intellectuals are beholden to the
neo-colonial state apparatus for their salaries or are engaged in petty commerce.
The leadership of the NJM was composed of lawyers, university lecturers, and
civil servants. Their class origins occasionally conflicted with the objectives they
had set for the progress of the revolution, while their vacillation and indecisive-
ness contributed to a weakening of the revolutionary leadership precisely at the
times it faced its greatest challenge-the turmoil during the months preceding
the collapse of the revolution in 1983.
Within the economic sphere, the PRG attempted to move the economy along
a "non-capitalist" path. Inheriting an economy in a state of stagnation with a
negative growth rate and double-digit inflation, coupled with the corruption
and mismanagement of the old regime, was no easy task. Three new sectors of
the economy were to be developed, following the strategy of non-capitalist
development-a public sector, a private sector and a brand new cooperative
sector. The public sector was dominated by some thirty state farms, several new
agro-processing plants built with Cuban aid and technical assistance, and a
state fishing and fish processing industry. Tourism presented the PRG with its
greatest economic potential. As Maurice Bishop noted of the new international
airport under construction at Port Salines,
... we as a people have agreed that the expansion of our tourism industry is
vital to the development of our country. We recognize tourism's impor-
tance in creating jobs for those who are still unemployed as new hotels,
restaurants, entertainment facilities and shopping areas spring up. We
recognize the increased market for our agricultural and agro-industrial
products. We see the benefits to our artisans proceeding from the
expanded sales of handicrafts and other souvenir items. We also recognize
the importance of tourism in offering opportunities for the expansion of
our private sector as well as the benefits to the people from the public
sector's investments in tourism. In short, the development of our tourism
role of the petit-bourgeoisie in attempting to build socialism in Jamaica, Trinidad and
Guyana is given an interesting, ifnot convincing, analysis in Anthony P. Maingot, "The
Difficult Path to Socialism in the English-Speaking Caribbean," in Richard Fagen (ed.),
Capitalism and the State in U.S.-Latin American Relations (Stanford: 1979), pp.
254-301.
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industry will bring with it previously unconceived development to our
country and benefits to all our people.9
9
Tourism, supported by the new international airport facility, would propel the
expansion of the public sector and stimulate rippling effects throughout the
economy, but it was the airport that would occupy center stage in the PRG's
confrontation with American imperialism. The PRG, leary of nationalization
of foreign banks, tooks over the Grenada Development Bank (GOB) and
established the National Commerical Bank to aid small farmers and assist in
other development projects.
The private sector was essential to the transitional economy, since the PRG
lacked capital and technology, as well as managerial and organizational exper-
tise. Questions concerning the role of the private sector and its ultimate
elimination were a bone of contention between the Coard and Bishop forces.
Coard, the impatient Marxist, wanted the private sector severly limited, while
Bishop, though supportive of the dissolution of the private sector, cautioned
against such a drastic move. The debate on the role of the private sector would
provide Coard with ammunition during the political crisis of July-September,
1983.10
The cooperative sector was brand new. Its role, according to Solodovnikov
and Bogoslovsky, was to (1) abolish "pre-bourgeois forms of exploitation"; (2)
"prevent capitalist tendencies in small-scale production"; and (3) "prepare the
socio-economic conditions for the transition from small-scale to large scale
production."ll For Coard, as Minister of Finance, this sector was critical in
hastening socialism but for many Grenadians it was anathema. The cooperative
sector was the weakest, when it was intended to be the strongest. The NJM's
inability to ideologically prepare the Grenadian people for the acceptance of the
cooperative sector had severe consequences as the revolution grew weaker.
Without substantial mass support for the transition to socialism, economic
9 Maurice Bishop, "Against U.S. Sabotage ofthe Airport Project," in Forward Ever!
Three Years ofthe Grenadian Revolution: Speeches ofMaurice Bishop (Sydney: 1982),
pp. 165-66.
10 It was this issue-accelerating the socialization of the economy-that proved to be
an important issue during the leadership crisis of September 1983. See Extraordinary
Meeting ofthe Central Committee ofthe NJM. 14-16 September. 1983. transcript of the
minutes; and Extraordinary General Meeting of the Full Members of the NJM, 25
September. 1983. transcript of the minutes; Colin Henfrey has devoted some attention to
this point in an important essay, "Between Populism and Leninism: The Grenadian
Experience," Latin American Perspectives. XI:3 (Summer 1984), pp. 15-36 but espe-
cially pp. 25-26.
11 V. Solodovnikov and V. Bogoslovsky, Non-Capitalist Development, p. 59.
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planning failed; as a consequence, the petit-bourgeois merchants and land-
holders were able to criticize the PRG's inability to implement this phase of
economic reform.
It was in the sphere of social services that the PRG made the most dramatic
gains. Education, health, housing, and community services made dramatic
strides. Just as in Cuba and Nicaragua, the quality of life of the people improved
in the first year. A substantial part of state revenue, foreign aid, Cuban technical
assistance, and the NJM program accounted for these substantial gains.
The Politics of the New Jewel Revolution:
The original manifesto of the NJM called for participatory democracy
through mass organization. The Grenadian revolution was the first extra-
constitutional removal ofa government in the British West Indies-and therein
lay the problem. Two centuries of British parlimentarianism had been over-
turned and perhaps this fact, more than any other aspect of the revolution, is
what terrified Grenada's neighbors throughout the Caribbean. As in Europe
and the United States, the Caribbean had moved to a kind of neo-Toryism.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the defeat of Michael Manley's demo-
cratic socialism in Jamaica in 1980. The reasons for this stunning defeat are
beyond the scope of this paper, but the parallels and similarities of that situation
were recalled in the Grenada destablization campaign, as we shall see.
Most Caribbean governments immediately recognized the revolutionary
regime but they wanted it legitimized according to the Westminister model. In
response to the calls for elections, Bishop warned,
There are those (some of them our friends) who believe that you cannot
have a democracy unless there is a situation where every five years and for
five seconds in those five years, a people are allowed to put an "X" next to
some candidate's name, and for those five seconds in those five years they
become democrats, and for the remainder of the time, four years and 364
days, they return to being nonpeople without any right to say anything to
their government, without any right to be involved in running their
country. We in Grenada do not regard that as being the real proof of
democracy. Instead, we ask ourselves: When decisions have to be taken
that are going to affect the lives of the people, are there mechanisms, are
there institutions and organizations that allow for the people to participate
and to express their views? Are there organizations on the ground that give
the people a real opportunity of expressing how they feel and on a daily
basis of being involved making decisions about their lives? 12
12 Maurice Bishop, "Forward Ever! Against Imperialism and Toward Genuine
National Independence and People's Power," in Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber
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By the summer of 1981, the mass organization had grown spectacularly. The
National Women's Organization (NWO), the National Youth Organization
(NYO), the growth and expansion of an already strong labor movement, and
the Agricultural and General Workers Union (AGWU) were all designed to
facilitate and simulate mass political participation. No doubt these organs of
mass participation were modelled on those in Cuba, the mass institutions of
poder popular,13 but that was not their only source. Many West Indian
intellectuals had been influenced heavily by the Trinidadian Trotskyist, C. L. R.
James, whose theories of self-organization and working-class self-activity moti-
vated a generation of West Indian, Afro-American, and American intellec-
tuals. 14 The growth of popular democracy in the years following the revolution
represented a groundswell of support for the PRG and the very popular
Maurice Bishop.
Though the mass organizations continued to grow and function indepen-
dently of the party, this appeared to bother some members of the Central
Committee. In an extraordinary document captured during the American
intervention, the text of a report Bishop prepared and presented to the Central
Committee of the NJM concerned the future direction of the revolution. The
text, titled "Line of March for the Party," dated September 13, 1982, disclosed
the emerging tensions within the Grenadian Revolution. Important for reveal-
ing the contradiction between vanguard and mass, Bishop's paper reviewed the
progress of the revolution, assessed the balance of class forces, and offered
suggestions for strengthening the Party. He noted that the Grenadian revolu-
tion was a
(eds.), Maurice Bishop Speaks: The Grenada Revolution, 1979-1983 (New York: 1983),
p.84.
13 See, for example, Union de Empresas de Medios de Propaganda, Adjunta al DOR
del CC del PCC, Organos del Poder Popular (La Habana: 1979); Marta Hanecker,
Cuba: Dictatorship or Democracy (Westport: 1980); and Archibald R. M. Ritter, "The
Organs of People's Power and the Communist Party: The Nature of Cuban Demo-
cracy," in Sandor Halebsky and John M. Kirk (eds.), Cuba: Twenty-Five Years of
Revolution, 1959-1984, (New York: 1985), pp. 270--90.
14"Socialism is nothing other than the self-organization of the proleteriat carried to its
ultimate limit." Grace Lee, Pierre Chaulieu and J. R. Johnson (c. L. R. James), Facing
Reality (Detroit, 1958), p. 90; additional texts are C. L. R. James, "The Workers'
Councils in Hungary," in The Future in the Present (London, 1977), pp. 175-82; Walter
Rodney, "The African Revolution," lecture at the Symposium on C. L. R. James,
University of Michigan, 31 March 1972; and Paul Buhle, "Marxism in the U.S.A." in
Paul Buhle (ed.), C. L. R. James: His Life and Work (Chicago, 1981), pp. 28-38.
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... national-democratic, anti-imperialist Revolution, involving the alliance
of many classes including sections of the small bourgeoisie but under the
leadership and with the dominant role being played by the working people
and particularly the working class, through their vanguard Party the
NJM.15
The undeveloped nature of the productive forces produced a small and
politically immature working class. As an agent of that class the role of the
Party was primary in this stage of the national democratic revolution. Bishop
called for a massive effort to politically and educationally mobilize the masses to
consolidate this phase, and move on to the next one-the transition to social-
ism. The role of the NJM was to prepare the masses to rule, according to
Bishop. In undertaking this activity, Bishop called for an expansion of party
membership, while Coard wanted even more rigorous admissions procedures.
This contradiction-between a vision of the party as an elite organization vs.
that of a mass organization-was the central political contradiction of the
revolution. Bishop's intent was to democratize the revolutionary party in order
to link the party to the mass organizations; Coard's, to centralize the processes
of decision-making and political participation. As one writer noted of the
incipient Bishop/ Coard rivalry,
Whereas Bishop was essentially pragmatic in his approach to policy
formulation and inclined to make use ofad hoc structures and discussions,
Coard was far more authoritarian in nature, preferring decision making in
a highly structured environment. They largely complemented each other;
while they certainly competed one against the other, it was largely benefi-
cial. But Bishop saw him as a potential rival and Coard knew it.16
The party entered a period of stagnation and indecisiveness. The policy
recommendations in Bishop's"Line of March" text were never implemented. In
the Central Committee Meeting of September 14-16, 1983, the political con-
tradictions surfaced into the open. The Coard forces complained of the collapse
of the Party and mass organizations while accusing the Central Committee of
"right opportunism." Bishop himself was charged with "one-manism" and
autocratic control over the Cc.
The Coard faction demanded a return to a strict level of "Leninist organiza-
tion and discipline," greater ideological clarity, and new strategies and tactics
15 Maurice Bishop, "Line of March for the Party Presented to General Meeting of the
Party on Monday 13 September 1982," in Paul Seabury and Walter McDougall (eds.),
The Grenada Papers, pp. 59-88. The quotation is from p. 65.
16Tony Thorndike, Grenada: Politics, Economics and Society (Boulder, 1985), p. 76.
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for rebuilding the Party and advancing the revolution. As the CC succumbed to
the Coard faction, Bishop withdrew. On September 25, 1983 the Coard forces
completed the internal coup by proposing joint leadership between Coard and
Bishop. Bishop would direct mass work and Coard would be responsible for
party organization and development. Bishop would preside over the Central
Committee while Coard would direct the Organizing Committee and the
Political Bureau. Bishop's refusal to accept these conditions led to his house
arrest. The rest of the story is already well known.
The political ramifications of Coard's ultra-leftism led to the demise and
collapse of the New Jewel revolution. When Bishop went to the masses in
October of 1983, it was already too late. The working people of Grenada had
felt themselves betrayed by their leaders, and the arrest and execution of Bishop
and his faction only contributed to their desertion of the revolution. The
NJM's inability to resolve its internal contradictions rendered impossible the
transforming of the subjective conditions of the revolution. Existing ideological
and propaganda work did not sufficiently prepare the working people to defend
it.
The United States / GEeS Intervention:
"As we rejoice in your renewed freedom, let us not forget that there are still
those who will do everything in their power to impose Communist dicta-
torship on the rest of us ... "
Ronald Reagan, Speech to the Grenadian People, February 20, 1986
From its inception, the Grenadian revolution faced the wrath and ire of the
United States, while the former colonial power, England, idly stood by and paid
lip service to American policy in the region. The American intervention was the
product of a set of pre-deterrnined ideological and geopolitical considerations.
First, the expansion of ties to Cuba and the Soviet bloc were viewed with great
suspicion. Second, the international airport at Port Salines was seen as a
possible Cuban / Soviet military base. Third was Grenada's geostrategic posi-
tion amidst the major oil supply lines and facilities in the American mare
nostrum. Fourth was the potential regionalization of the Grenadian revolution
to the smaller Eastern Caribbean islands. And fifth, the impact of the Grena-
dian revolution on the other English-speaking black population, most notably
the Afro-American population of the United States, was also a concern.
Almost immediately, the PRG faced a scolding from the United States.
Jimmy Carter's ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, flew to
11
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Grenada three weeks after the revolution and warned Bishop that the U.S.
would " ... view with displeasure any tendency on the part of Grenada to
develop closer ties with Cuba."I? In response to American strictures against
improved Grenada-Cuba ties, Maurice Bishop gave his famous "In Nobody's
Backyard" speech:
Grenada is a sovereign and independent country, although a tiny speck on
the world map, and we expect all countries to strictly respect our indepen-
dence just as we will respect theirs. No country has the right to tell us what
to do or how to run our country or who to be friendly with. We certainly
would not attempt to tell any other country what to do. We are not in
anybody's backyard, and we are definitely not for sale. Anybody who
thinks they can bully us or threaten us clearly has no understanding, idea,
or clue as to what material we are made of. They clearly have no idea of the
tremendous struggles which our people have fought over the past seven
years. Though small and poor, we are proud and determined. We would
sooner give up our lives before we compromise, sell out, or betray our
sovereignty, our independence, our integrity, our manhood, and the right
of our people to national self-determination and social progress. 18
Cuban aid took many forms. More than $33.6 million (U.S.) was supplied in
equipment and personnel to the international airport, the largest donation. In
addition, doctors, dentists, teachers and other "international workers" ap-
peared within months of the insurrection. Moreover, confiscated documents
present evidence that an Eastern European presence developed, including
Czech military and East German intelligence advisers. The People's Republic of
Korea gave $12 million in free military assistance in 1983. It is important to
point out that an ongoing internal destablization had begun soon after the
establishment of the PRG, and military aid to the regime was perceived as
necessary to counter the very real threat of an American invasion.
Following Ronald Reagan's election, U.S.-Grenada relations worsened.
Covert action and other forms of destablization began to occur. A review of
these events is necessary to understand how the escalation of destabilization
culminated in the U.S. invasion. In the fall of 1979 two of the most important
trade unions-the Seamen's and Waterfront Workers Union (SWWU) and
that of the electrical workers, the Technical and Allied Workers Union
(TAWU)-attempted to call a strike to protest the income tax. Though the
strike did not materialize, disruptions of all sorts continued-work refusal,
17EPICA Task Force, Grenada, p. 61.
18Bruce Marcus and Michael Taber (eds.), Maurice Bishop Speaks, p. 31.
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pilferage, and other forms of economic sabotage. In November, the TAWU's
leader ordered a power shutdown, a prelude to a plot to burn down the capital
at St. George's. The leaders of these two unions-Chris Stuart, Eric Pierre,
Stanley Roberts, and ChIistopher Strachan-had all been trained by the
American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), a strong anti-
communist organization with known CIA ties. 19 In November, the PRG
detained a group of counter-revolutionaries led by Wilton de Ravinere, a police
officer, and Winston Whyte, a member of the ultra-right United People's Party.
The group also included members of the "Budhlall gang"-a criminal clique
involved in the growth and sale of "ganja." These elements were linked to
Stanley Cyrus, a Grenadian who taught Spanish at Howard University. Cyrus
was suspected of having links to the CIA; on his return to Grenada he became
involved in a series of plots to overthrow the PRG with the assistance of the
"Budhlall gang."20 On June 19, 1980 thousands of Grenadians gathered at a
rally to honor the nation's heroes. A bomb went off under the speaker's
platform, killing three young women and injuring one hundred. A former
sergeant of the People's Revolutionary Army was linked to the bombing. When
security forces attempted to arrest him a shootout ensued, and he was killed. At
his home, a mini-arsenal was found. Throughout 1980 and 1981 bombings
continued, while internal security attempted to grapple with subversion.21
The Cuban-Soviet-Grenada-Nicaragua-Surinam axis was at the core of the
190n trade union subversion in the Caribbean, see Jeffrey Harrod, Trade Union
Foreign Policy: A Study ofthe Activities ofAmerican and British Trade Unions in the
Caribbean (Garden City, New York: 1972); Ronald Radosh, American Labor and U. S.
Foreign Policy (New York, 1969), subversion in the hemisphere is covered in pp.
304-452; George Morris, CIA and American Labor (New York, 1967), pp. 88-91;
documents the destabilization of Cheddi Jagan's election in Guyana during 1964-1965.
The early counterrevolutionary incidents are covered in detail in EPICA Task Force,
Grenada, pp. 66-68.
20The activities of the Budhlall gang are given careful scrutiny in "Grenada: What
Went Wrong? An Interview with Don Rojas," in The Black Nation, IV:I (Summer /
Fall 1984), pp. 15-24. The entire destabilization campaign is covered in a remarkable
analysis by Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap, "U.S. Crushes Caribbean Jewel," Covert Action
Information Bulletin, 20 (Winter 1984), pp. 3-20; on the Rastafarian role in the
revolution and counterrevolution, see Horace Campbell, "The Rastafarians in the
Eastern Caribbean," Caribbean Quarterly, XXVI:4 (December 1980), pp. 42-61, but
especially pp. 50-55.
21 Internal and external subversion ofthe revolution is given an extensive treatment in
"Dossier on Propaganda destabilization; Economic Aggression; Political/Diplomatic
and Industrial destablization; Terrorist and Counter-Revolutionary Activities; and
Mercenary threats and military maneoevres [sic]," New Jewel Movement, n. p. I am
grateful to the staff of TRANSAFRICA for allowing me access to this document.
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U.S. concern in the region. Grenada, it was perceived, was becoming "another
Cuba" and had to be stopped. Cuba, the pearl of the Antilles, stood on the
northern border of the American mare nostrum, Grenada on its southern flank;
Nicaragua had established a revolutionary regime on the American continent,
and Surinam had gained a toehold on the South American continent. The
Reagan doctrine of "reverse containment" emerged from the hemispheric
realities of revolution on the borders of the U.S.-not in some distant far-off
lands. Not only must Communism be contained, it must be rolled back at all
costs.
The new international airport was a particular threat to the balance of power
in the hemisphere. Though the airport had been sanctioned as strictly for
tourism by U.S. allies, Canada and England, to handle larger aircraft and avoid
the mandatory stopover in Barbados or Trinidad, the Reagan administration
viewed it as a potential Cuban / Soviet base equipped to handle advanced
combat aircraft, helicopter gunships, and the like.
The PRG had pointed out that Barbados and Trinidad possessed similiar
facilities. Even tiny St. Lucia doubled its tourist traffic following the construc-
tion of an international airport. As has already been pointed out, tourism was
seen as the essential economic tool in lifting Grenada from her underdevelop-
ment; but the airport itself suffered from cost-overruns. Confiscated documents
indicate that construction costs had drained the Treasury by 1983, diverting
funds from other projects, and led to increased pressure for more Soviet aid.
The airport was of far less concern to Grenada's neighbors, as we shall see.
Following completion of the airport with U.S. aid, the State Department finally
admitted that it had no military purposes.22
The geopolitical and geostrategic considerations behind the invasion also
loomed heavily. In a 1983 speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger contended that the United States
22 On the international airport at Port Salines and its importance to the economy see
"Airport Special" Permanent Mission of Grenada to North America, Grenada News
(April-May 1981), 8 pages; on the debate of alleged Cuban I Soviet uses ofthe airport
see two interesting articles by Joseph Treaster, "Airport is Ready, but Grenada is Not,"
The New York Times (July 25, 1984) and "New Airport, Still Unfinished, Is Open in
Grenada," The New York Times (October 29, 1984). Treaster noted in the latter article,
"Many Grenadians say that they are not sure what the Cubans had in mind, but that the
earliest studies by British engineers nearly thirty years ago always saw the airport as a
boom to tourism and development." The correspondent of the Manchester Guardian
Weekly, Alex Brummer, pointed out that the United States had military designs on the
airport in a post-invasion Grenada; "Port Salines airport to be permanent U.S. base?"
The Guardian Weekly (November 20, 1983).
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must not only resist Soviet incursions in the Third World but must also
17
. . . seek to reverse the geographic expansion of Soviet control and
presence, particularly when it threatens a vital interest or further erodes the
geostrategic position of the United States and its allies.23
"Geostrategic position" refers to the assumption within conservative military
circles that the Soviet Union would cripple the West by gaining control of
critical sea lanes and securing a critical stranglehold over Western economics by
"interdicting" these sea routes. This thinking was also reflected by Admiral
Robert P. McKenzie, who pointed out that the region was vital to American
interests since all of the country's imports, including oil, must pass these sea
lanes on their way to U.S. ports. He stated the Soviets knew this and with the
establishment of Soviet bases in Cuba in the west and Grenada in the east, it was
important to realize that Grenada was "... strategically located in a region
where the sea lanes coverage."24 Admiral Thomas H. Moorer (ret.), Chairman
of Nixon's Joint Chiefs of Staff, put the geostrategic considerations in a much
clearer perspective. He argued that the international airport was unacceptable
because "it would be a staying field for Soviet and Libyan aircraft" en route to
Central America.25 Finally, General Wallace Nutting, chief of the U.S. Readi-
ness Command, said:
When MIGs can operate out of Grenada and Nicaragua, as well (as Cuba),
it will enable someone to cover most of the oil production facilities in the
Caribbean, all oil refineries there, plus the sea lanes through which crude
moves to the U.S. and through the Panama Canal. That is a major
potential threat to the U.S.26
Is it any wonder than when Eugenia Charles phoned Reagan, the U.S. would
move unhesitatingly to put an end to this so-called Soviet base within Ameri-
ca's mare nostrum?
Grenada's neighbors claimed they had the most to fear from the installation
of the revolutionary government. As early as 1970, the socialist intelligentsia of
the English-speaking West Indies held a secret meeting at Rat Island, off St.
23Quoted in Michael T. Klare, "Grenada Syndrome," The Nation (November 12,
1983).
24 Ibid.
25"How Oil Fueled theInvasion of Grenada," Business Week (November 7, 1983). On
the importance of the Windward / Leeward passages for American trade, see United
States Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, Essential United States
Foreign Trade Routes (Washington, D.C.: 1975).
26Quoted in, "How Oil Fueled the Invasion of Grenada."
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Lucia. It was called following the Trinidadian Black Power disturbances in
order to review the possibilities for social and political revolution in the region.
It was composed of revolutionaries from all over the region, including Bishop
and Coard from Grenada, Trevor Munroe of Jamaica, Georg OdIum of St.
Lucia, Tim Hector of Antigua, Ralph Gonsalves of St. Vincent, Bill Riviere of
Dominica, and others who met to sponsor a series of forums throughout the
region to put socialism on the agenda. These meetings continued throughout
the 1970s. In an extraordinary document, provided one dismisses its anti-
Communist bias and pro-V.S. sympathies, Albert Xavier, editor of the inde-
pendent newspaper Torchlight (closed down in late 1979 by the PRG for
fostering counterrevolutionary sentiments and attitudes), revealed that a series
of secret meetings had been held in Grenada following the establishment of the
PRG. Mr. Xavier noted,
In November 1979, Mr. Bishop called his first meeting-a successor to the
Rat Island Conference. The participants in that meeting were chosen from
St. Lucia, Dominica and of course, Grenada. At the end of the delibera-
tions, the conferees signed what they called "the St. George's Accord." The
most significant article of that agreement was that nations of the three
island states should be able to travel to members states without a passport.
This article was exploited by those in the communist network as a means of
deploying their forces in a more unified fashion throughout the islandsP
There was indeed reason to be concerned. Most of the governments of the
Eastern Caribbean had fallen into conservative hands. Their regimes often
engaged in the subtle repression of the opposition, as in Dominica and St.
Vincent, or were threatened by mercenary action. In a curious sidelight to the
Grenadian Revolution, a motley crew of Nazis and Ku Klux Klansmen planned
to invade Dominica in 1981. After the discovery of the invasion by the FBI,
Prime Minister Charles requested a regional security treaty from the V nited
States.28
Grenada was also seen as a staging point for island-wide subversion. The
27 Albert Xavier, "Plotting that had the Eastern Caribbean on Edge," The Wall Street
Journal (December 31, 1983); on the development of the left in the region see Tad Szulc,
"Radical Winds in the Caribbean," The New York Times Magazine (May 25,1980); the
Argentinian anthropologist Andres Serbin has written two important articles on the left
in the region and the wider implications that had held, "La Evolucion de la Ideologla de
la Izquierda Caribeiia," Neuva Sociedad, 61 (Julio-Agosto 1982), pp. 55-65 and "Las
Experiencias Recientes del Socialismo Caribeno," Nueva Sociedad, 63 (Noviembre-
Diciembre 1982), pp. 95-102. Nueva Sociedad is published in San Jose, Costa Rica.
28"Klansmen are among 10 Indicted in Plot on Caribbean Island Nation, "The New
York Times (May 8,1981); "Dominica Unsettled in the Wake of Thwarted Invasion,"
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Soviet Union had constructed a 75-kilowatt transmitter at Beausejour which
would allow free and unhampered radio transmission. In addition, with five
percent of its population under arms and another five percent capable of
military activity, the PRA and militia outsized the combined defense forces of
the Eastern Caribbean. The OECS was formed in response to the Grenadian
threat, and in order to secure American economic and military assistance. In
addition to the destablization activities in which the U.S. had been engaged for
three years prior to the invasion, it had also initiated a set of massive military
maneuvers in October 1981 at Vieques island, off the coast of Puerto Rico.
Labelled "Ocean Venture '81," the maneuvers staged a mock invasion of Amber
and the Amberdines, an undisguised reference to Grenada and the Grenadines.
The invasion involved the rescue of American hostages and the establishment
of a regime favorable to the American way of life. It was these maneuvers and a
host of related activities that led to the increasing role of military and security
considerations within the Grenadian revolution. In a speech broadcast over
Radio Free Grenada March 25, 1983, and monitored by the CIA's Foreign
Broadcast Information Service. Prime Minister Maurice Bishop alluded to the
following steps in the escalation of destablization. It is important to quote this
text in full to grasp the full significance of the counterrevolution, and the
convergence of internal and external forces hostile to the revolution:
Firstly, that a team of counterrevolutionaires, Grenadians and non-
Grenadians have been meeting more frequently in recent months.
Secondly, that opportunists and reactionary elements who aspire to grab
power have begun to resolve their leadership difference with the aim of
creating a more united counterrevolutionary front.
Thirdly, that their coordination with the Central Intelligence Agency-the
CIA-has stepped up.
Fourthly, that they have already received direct assistance from the CIA in
the form of money, arms and training, and they have also received offers of
transportation, logistical support and supplies and an undertaking that
immediately on launching their attack their declared counterrevolutionary
government will receive United States recognition.
Fifthly, we have been able to discover the names and full background of
the main CIA case officer responsible for coordinating the present plot. We
The New York Times (June 7, 1981); a second coup attempt occurred in December:
"Coup Attempt Fails in Dominica," The New York Times (December 29, 1981); the
security implications of these attempts are covered in the article by Ellen Ray and Bill
Schaap, p. 5.
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know his name. We know where he has worked before. We know what his
previous activities have been and know which other revolutionary pro-
cesses he has attempted to subvert in recent times.
Sixth, another CIA case officer involved in this operation is known to have
been involved in directing and masterminding the operations to assassinate
the leadership that resulted in the murderous June 19th bomb blast.
Seventhly, these elements have established direct links with the Cuban
exile group which was responsible for the Air Cubana disaster and also
with Somozista counterrevolutionary elements who are right now in-
volved in the invasion of Nicaragua.
Eighthly, with the assistance of the CIA, these elements have been to get
some of the criminal elements which (?to be) [sic] used in the invasion of
our country, trained in Miami in some of the same camps in which the
Somozista ~contras" and various other mercenaries have been trained.
Ninthly, as part of their planning process, the CIA helped to allocate
different sets of these criminal counterrevolutionaries for the physical
attack against Nicaragua and Grenada, and they decided several weeks ago
to attack during this precise period in order to coincide with massive
military maneuvers taking place in our region at this time and as a
culmination of the major propaganda offensive of Reagan and his cease-
less comments against the revolutionary processes in the region.
The tenth point, the main base of operations and activities of these
elements is one of our neighboring territories only a few miles away from
Grenada.
Eleventh, as a result of all this (words indistinct) [sic] we have been able,
not only to uncover the actual plan to overthrow our government and turn
back our revolution, but also the approximate number of men they hope to
use, the approximate number and type ofarms they possess and the kind of
logistical support they hope to receive. We know comrades the target they
intend to destroy. We know many of the (?forces) [sic] they intend to
arrange, those they plan to kill and how they plan to strike terror and fear
among the broad masses.
And twelfth and finally, it is necessary to (?reemphasize) [sic], to doubly
emphasize that we know the actual period in the near future that they are
hoping to use to launch their murderous attack. (Words indistinct) [sic]
considering the clear and disturbing patterns of United States intervention
and aggression in our region and the world, the largescale invasion of
Nicaragua now taking place, we have concluded that the danger we
perceive in this period is real and imminent.
When the President of the United States of America, who is also
Commander-in-Chief ofthe Armed Forces, states publicly and clearly that
tiny Grenada is a threat to the national security of the mighty and powerful
United States of America and when his top advisors and military personnel
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indicate that the time has come to put teeth into their rhetoric, then it is
clear that Goliath has finally turned his full attention to David.29
21
In a last-ditch effort to improve relations with the United States, Bishop
undertook an American tour in 1983, where the Reagan administration
rebuffed him. It was during this tour that the Bishop spoke to several thousand
Americans at Hunter College in New York. In concluding, it takes little
imagination to realize the significance of that speech for Afro-Americans:
I want to tell you about that one (a report) [sic] so that you can reflect on it.
That secret report made this point: that the Grenada revolution is in one
sense even worse-I'm using their language-than the Cuban and Nicara-
guan revolutions because the people of Grenada and the leadership of
Grenada speak English, and therefore can communicate directly with the
people of the United States. But I want to tell you what that same report
said that also made us very dangerous. That is the people and the leader-
ship of Grenada are predominantly Black. They said that 95% of our
population is Black-and they have the correct statistic-and if we have
95% of predominantly African origin in our country, then we can have a
dangerous appeal to 30 million Black people in the U.S. Now that aspect of
the report, clearly, is one of the most sensible.30
Most sensible, indeed.
29 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, March 29, 1983.
30Maurice Bishop, "Maurice Bishop Speaks to U.S. Working People," in Bruce
Marcus and Michael Taber (eds.), Maurice Bishop Speaks, p. 299. Bishop's potential
influence on the large Afro-American population cannot be ignored in light ofthe secret
Carter-Brezinski National Security Memorandum of 1978. Cf. Presidential Review
Memorandum / National Security Council-46, "Black Africa and the U.S. Black
Movement." TRANSAFRICA obtained this document in 1978.
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